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Abstract 
This paper employs an interpretive approach to explore New Labour’s use of social 
scientific theories in developing its foreign policy.  After situating New Labour in the 
broad tradition of social democracy, it outlines the beliefs that most social democrats 
shared about the values of internationalism, international community and moral 
leadership.  Taking these concepts in turn, the paper then considers how New Labour 
modified their content in response to issues raised by ‘New Times’.  In so doing, it 
problematizes New Labour’s responses by revealing that they drew on ideas taken 
from complex interdependence theory, communitarianism and democratic peace 
theory respectively.  The paper then examines how these theories, in conjunction with 
the reformulation of its foreign policy, influenced New Labour’s transformation of the 
three values, before concluding with a brief examination of the dilemmas arising from 
this process.    
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A Renewed Social Democracy for an ‘Age of Internationalism’: An 
Interpretivist Account of New Labour’s Foreign Policy 
 
New Labour’s philosophy and programme were fundamentally shaped by its belief in 
globalisation.  This process is associated with the expansion of world financial 
markets, the increased mobility of capital and the intensification of global trade 
competition.  At the same time, ‘travel, communications and culture are becoming 
more and more international, shrinking the world and expanding taste, choice and 
knowledge’ (Blair 1996).  These developments were accompanied by dramatic social 
changes as the influence of custom declined, cultural and family ties loosened, and 
previously stable communities collapsed (Driver and Martell 2006, 22).  For the 
architects of New Labour, these ‘New Times’ posed a significant challenge to the 
social democratic tradition, in response to which they advocated the ‘Third Way’.  
This programme, Tony Blair explained, stood for a ‘modernised social democracy, 
passionate in its commitment to … the goals of the centre-left, but flexible, innovative 
and forward-looking in the means to achieve them’ (1998, 1). 
 
In New Labour’s narrative of ‘New Times’, globalisation was represented as an 
‘unstoppable force’ to which governments needed to adapt (Blair 2010, 689).  While 
this representation played an important role in the rationalisation of New Labour’s 
programme of modernisation and renewal (McGrew 2004, 141), it is worth noting that 
‘globalisation’ is not a given fact, but a contingent concept that can be constructed in 
a variety of different ways.1  The desire to expose the contingency of social life is 
central to the interpretivist approach of Mark Bevir and Rod Rhodes.  As Bevir puts 
it, ‘no practice can fix the ways in which its participants will act, let alone how they 
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will innovate within it in response to novel circumstances’ (2005, 21).  One way in 
which politicians can modernise a practice is by drawing on ‘rationalities’ taken from 
the social sciences.  Rationalities are defined as ‘the scientific beliefs and associated 
technologies that govern conduct; [the term] captures the ways in which governments 
and other social actors draw on knowledge to construct policies and practices’ (Bevir 
and Rhodes 2010, 96-97).  This process may necessitate a modification of the values 
associated with the traditions against the backdrop of which agents operate (Bevir 
2005, 63), which in turn can give rise to new dilemmas and challenges.           
 
Despite the insights it can offer, interpretivism has not been widely used in the 
analysis of UK foreign policy.  This is evident from a survey of the vast literature on 
New Labour’s foreign policy, which typically focuses on case studies2 and employs a 
variety of methods, including discourse analysis (Fairclough 2000, ch. 6), agential 
explanations (Dyson 2009; Hoggett 2005), structural analysis (Kettell 2006) and 
security studies (Bluth 2004).  The present paper seeks to contribute to this debate by 
using an interpretive approach to show how New Labour’s construction of, and 
response to, ‘New Times’ relied on rationalities taken from the social sciences.3  I 
begin by locating New Labour in the broad tradition of social democracy and 
sketching the beliefs that many social democrats shared about the values of 
internationalism, international community and moral leadership.  Taking these 
commitments in turn, I consider how New Labour modified them in response to the 
challenges of ‘New Times’.  In so doing, I problematize these responses by 
demonstrating that they drew on complex interdependence theory, 
neocommunitarianism and democratic peace theory respectively.  I then show how 
these rationalities, in conjunction with New Labour’s reformulation of its foreign 
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policy, led it to modify the content of the three values, before concluding with an 
examination of the dilemmas arising therefrom.    
 
New Labour and social democracy 
 
The New Labour project was a contingent reworking of the dominant tradition within 
social democracy in response to the socio-economic challenges of ‘New Times’.  
While this dominant tradition has its roots in ethical socialism, Fabianism and 
liberalism, writes Bevir, it is important to note that social democracy contains a 
number of competing strands (2005, 135).  Thus, ‘when we invoke it, or for that 
matter New Labour [or] Old Labour … we simplify complex patterns of beliefs and 
loyalties in order to interpret broad political movements’.  Nevertheless, Bevir 
continues, we can identify in general terms a social democratic tradition that views 
human existence and flourishing as possible only within a community (2005, 43).  
This belief finds expression in Blair’s claim that ‘we all depend on collective goods 
for our independence; and all our lives are enriched – or impoverished – by the 
communities to which we belong’ (1998, 4).        
 
Since its inception, the Labour party’s approach to foreign policy has been founded on 
a belief in internationalism.  This belief incorporated themes from radical liberalism, 
as well as Fabian, Nonconformist and Christian socialist ideas, and can be broadly 
defined as ‘the desire to transcend national barriers in order to find solutions to 
international issues’ (Vickers 2004, 193).  However, the breadth of this concept 
ensures that it can be interpreted in a variety of ways, with different definitions 
predominating at different times in Labour’s history.  As such, internationalism does 
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not offer decisive policy prescriptions, and so can be invoked to justify ‘non-
intervention in the pursuit of peace, or intervention for military or humanitarian 
means’ (Vickers 2004, 194).  This concept can be disaggregated into three 
commitments, namely internationalism, international community and moral 
leadership, and I now consider them in turn.                
 
As Rhiannon Vickers correctly points out, Labour’s conception of internationalism 
draws on the liberal notion that although anarchy is the basic condition of the 
international system, states nonetheless have certain interests and values in common.  
For this reason, many social democrats believed it was possible to reform the system 
through the construction of international organisations, whose role was to ‘regulate 
economic, political and military relations between states’.  They also believed that an 
important function of these institutions was to provide collective security against 
aggression.  As such, most social democrats rejected the balance of power and secret 
bilateral treaties, viewing them as ‘self-defeating in terms of generating conflict’ 
(2004, 194).   
 
Throughout Labour’s history, social democrats have disagreed over the means for 
achieving their internationalist goals.  On the issue of security, for instance, Attlee, 
Bevin and others sought to further Britain’s national interest through closer ties with 
the USA, a relationship that was eventually institutionalised through NATO.  
However, many on the left of the party opposed this decision, believing instead that 
‘internationalism and international solidarity meant working with Russia, not 
capitalist America’.  This disagreement remained unresolved, and, by the end of the 
Cold War, the rift between left and right had hardened into ‘a division between 
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Atlanticists and those suspicious of the USA, which continues to this day’ (Vickers 
2004, 12; see also Rosen 2005, 141, 143-146).  Similarly, in the debate over Britain’s 
entry into the Common Market, pro-Europeans argued that internationalism meant 
closer ties with Europe (Mackintosh 1971, in Rosen 2005, 299), while Eurosceptics 
believed Britain’s future instead lay with the Commonwealth (Gaitskell 1962, in 
Brivati 2004, 235).  This issue also split the party, and indeed was the main reason 
why some pro-European Labour MPs broke away and formed the SDP in 1981 
(Brivati 2004, 237).                
 
A second theme within Labour’s version of internationalism is the idea that states 
belong to an international community.  For this reason, social democrats held that 
‘each state has a responsibility to work towards the common good of the international 
system, to work in the “international” interest rather than purely in what it perceives 
to be its national interest’ (Vickers 2004, 194).  Many within the Labour Party also 
believed in the existence of universal moral values such as democracy and human 
rights.  Because they saw domestic and foreign policy as ‘inextricably linked, and as 
impacting on each other’, these social democrats claimed the values that governed 
their conduct at home must be reflected in their dealings with other states.4   On this 
basis, they endorsed a democratic foreign policy that was founded on openness and 
co-operation (Vickers 2004, 197-198).    
 
In practice, Labour violated its commitment to a democratic foreign policy on several 
occasions, including the secret negotiations on Britain’s nuclear weapons strategy in 
1947 (Vickers 2004, 199).  Arguably the most shocking example is the 1966 
agreement authorising the depopulation of the island of Diego Garcia to make way for 
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a US military base, which was signed without the approval of Parliament or Congress.  
In return for its co-operation, the US government allowed Britain to purchase Polaris 
nuclear missiles at a reduced cost (Vine 2009, 7, 87).  While this agreement 
manifested the Atlanticist tendency within Labour, it also reflected the belief that the 
party needed to appear strong on defence in the eyes of the public (Vickers 2004, 
203), on which basis the Wilson government retained its predecessor’s commitment to 
Polaris.  The latter decision brought Wilson and his supporters into direct conflict 
with Labour’s anti-militarist wing, who viewed unilateral nuclear disarmament as a 
means of providing moral leadership in the world.  This is the third theme within 
Labour’s internationalism and I examine next.  
 
Labour’s commitments to universal moral values and the pursuit of the international 
as well as the national interest were closely linked to its belief that Britain could act as 
a moral leader.  In Vickers’ words, this idea  
Reflects the context within which the Labour Party developed, as well as 
its tendency to have a missionary zeal to reform and shape the world in 
its likeness, which has sometimes been at odds with its commitment to 
working through international institutions’ (2004, 197).   
As we would expect, the precise nature of Britain’s moral leadership role was 
contested, with different approaches achieving prominence at different times in 
Labour’s history.  This moral imperative has been manifested variously as 
commitments to international disarmament and arms control and, in the Cold War era, 
as the belief that Britain could act as a ‘bridge’ between East and West, mediating in 
disputes between the two sides (Vickers 2004, 196-197).  It has also been interpreted 
as the provision of international aid and debt relief for developing countries.  While it 
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is important to recognise these diverse interpretations of moral leadership, it is 
nonetheless possible to identify two recurring themes, namely an anti-militarist 
impulse and a commitment to tackling poverty and oppression across the world.    
 
It is clear from the discussion so far that there are several competing traditions within 
the Labour Party, and that their contrasting interpretations of its internationalist 
principles have created deep divisions within it.  Indeed, the recognition of this 
diversity helps us to explain such major shifts in Labour policy as that from an anti- to 
a pro-European position in the 1980s.  In the following three sections, I take Labour’s 
internationalist commitments in turn and show how New Labour’s response to the 
challenges of ‘New Times’ transformed the tradition of social democracy.  In so 
doing, I problematize this response by demonstrating that it relied on ideas taken from 
the social sciences.  I also consider how New Labour’s reformulation of its foreign 
policy entailed changes in the content of the values of internationalism, international 
community and moral leadership.  
 
Internationalism 
 
Labour’s belief in internationalism endured throughout the post-1945 era, with a 
succession of party leaders expressing their support for the United Nations and the 
NATO alliance (e.g. Attlee 1951; Wilson 1964, 1970; Kinnock 1985; Smith 1992).  It 
also persisted in the early 1980s when, notwithstanding his controversial commitment 
to withdraw Britain from the Common Market, Michael Foot promised that Labour 
would fulfil ‘our international obligations and our obligations as socialists to other 
people in other lands’ (1982).  Following its defeat in the 1983 general election, the 
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party reverted to a more traditional stance, as evidenced by its 1987 manifesto 
commitment to work with the UN and the Commonwealth to promote freedom and 
reduce conflict across the world (Labour Party 1987).  By the early 1990s, however, 
the world was facing new transnational challenges following the collapse of 
communism.  Blair identified the most obvious of these issues as ‘security and 
environmental protection’, and he argued that ‘our global governing institutions [had] 
not adapted sufficiently fast in response’.  As a result, he continued, it was necessary 
to ‘deepen and extend [the EU, NATO and the WTO], not reject them’ (1998, 18).  
  
Throughout its term of office, New Labour’s foreign policy was premised on the 
claim that globalisation had produced a new world order in which nation states were 
interdependent.  As a result of this interdependence, Blair argued, economic, security 
and political developments in other countries can create a ripple effect that is felt 
around the globe.  For instance: 
Financial instability in Asia destroys jobs in Chicago and in my own 
constituency in County Durham.  Poverty in the Caribbean means more 
drugs on the streets in Washington and London.  Conflict in the Balkans 
causes more refugees in Germany and here in the US (1999).        
Thus, Blair continued, ‘we live in a world where isolationism has ceased to have a 
reason to exist’; in short, ‘we are all internationalists now, whether we like it or not’ 
(1999).  This belief was shared by Robin Cook who, in launching his Mission 
Statement for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, declared that ‘this is an age of 
internationalism … We live in a world in which nation states are interdependent’ 
(1997).  Similarly, Cook’s successor, Jack Straw, asserted that ‘our party’s 
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commitment to internationalism means we are best placed to confront the challenges 
of our complex, interdependent world’ (2003).             
 
For New Labour, the rise of interdependence brought the recognition that the Britain’s 
interests were inextricably linked to those of other states.  After all, Blair claimed, ‘as 
problems become global – competitivity, changes in technology, crime, drugs, family 
breakdown – so the search for solutions becomes global too ... We are all coping with 
the same issues’ (1999; see also Cook 1997, Straw 2003).  On this basis, New Labour 
proposed to manage the insecurities generated by ‘New Times’ by ‘working within 
and through … existing multilateral organisations of global and regional governance, 
from the WTO to the EU’ (McGrew 2004, 143).  Thus, on the environment, Gordon 
Brown argued that ‘together the UN and the World Bank must work to create a global 
environmental presence that exhorts, incentivises, researches and monitors [climate] 
change and most of all is in a position – alongside the private sector – to invest in 
change’ (2006).  Likewise, Clare Short claimed that ‘New Times’ demanded global 
solidarity, and in particular ‘a strengthening not a weakening of our global institutions 
and a stronger commitment to development and the reduction of poverty’ (2001, 
quoted in McGrew 2004, 143).      
 
Like traditional social democracy, New Labour emphasised the importance of 
international organisations for the preservation of global order.  Cook identified 
NATO as the cornerstone of Britain’s security, and he argued that its ongoing 
enlargement must be managed to ensure that the process both strengthened the 
Alliance and reduced the tensions between East and West (1997).  At the same time, 
Cook and Blair expressed their commitment to Europe, claiming that membership of 
 11 
the European Union would strengthen Britain’s relationship with the US.  It was thus 
that New Labour ‘squared the circle of internationalism, European unity and the 
Anglo-American relationship during its first term of office’ (Coates, Krieger and 
Vickers 2004, 12-13).   
 
The Kosovo crisis of 1999 marked a turning point, as it led Blair to urge ‘a critical 
examination of … the changes we need to make in organisation and structure’ of 
NATO once operations were concluded.  More specifically, he argued, Kosovo 
underlined the need for the international community to take decisive action against 
dictators like Slobodan Milošević, who had ‘brought calamity on their own peoples’, 
and thus to deter others – such as Saddam Hussein – from doing the same.  This was 
particularly important, Blair continued, because if NATO’s campaign in Kosovo had 
failed, ‘the next dictator to be threatened with military force may well not believe our 
resolve to carry the threat through’ and international security could be compromised 
as a result (1999).      
 
Following the attacks of 11 September 2001, Blair claimed that the major security 
threat in an interdependent world was not conventional warfare between nation states, 
but ‘chaos’ (2002a).  He identified the two main causes of chaos as terrorism and 
rogue states in possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and argued that 
the link between them was becoming stronger, that there was a ‘real and present 
danger’ of terrorist organisations acquiring WMD (2003a).  Of particular concern was 
Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, which had continued to develop WMD in defiance of UN 
resolutions and, as such, posed a grave threat to the stability of the Middle East.  For 
Blair, it was vital that the international community confront this danger directly, or 
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risk undermining the credibility of the UN.  After all, he claimed, ‘weakness in the 
face of a threat from a tyrant is the surest way not to peace but to war’ (2003a).  In the 
same vein, Straw told Parliament on the eve of the invasion that the consequences of 
inaction would be ‘an undermining of the authority of the United Nations, the 
rearmament of Iraq, a worsening of the regime’s tyranny, an end to the hopes of 
millions in Iraq, and a message to tyrants elsewhere that defiance pays’ (Hansard 18 
March 2003, vol. 401, col. 902).    
 
In accordance with the precedent set by Kosovo, Britain went into Iraq as part of the 
US-led ‘coalition of the willing’.  This decision was opposed by many on the left of 
New Labour, who argued contra the party leadership that such action would harm the 
national interest by undermining the authority of the UN.  As Cook explained, 
‘Britain is not a superpower.  Our interests are best protected, not by unilateral action, 
but by multilateral agreement and a world order governed by rules’ (quoted in Coates 
and Krieger 2004, 85).  Short’s assessment of the situation was more direct: ‘there’s a 
risk of a divided world, with a weakened UN and we shouldn’t be doing it like this’ 
(BBC 2003).  Thus, social democrats on both sides of the debate retained Labour’s 
traditional belief in strong international organisations, though they were deeply 
divided over how this goal was to be achieved.  
 
In the past, many social democrats emphasised collective security and international 
organisations as the means to promote peace.  However, Blair and his followers 
believed that in an interdependent world, where conventional warfare is no longer the 
principal threat to national security, a new strategy was required.  To this end, they 
rejected the formal multilateralism associated with traditional social democracy in 
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favour of a more ad hoc approach.  Although New Labour did not employ this 
informal multilateralism in the sphere of trade and finance, notes Paul Williams, it 
was clearly evident in its international security policy after the Kosovo conflict.  The 
emergence of this new strategy, Williams continues, was facilitated by Blair’s belief 
that UN authorisation was not required for humanitarian intervention, and the New 
Labour government’s acquisition of several ad hoc coalitions of the willing through 
which it could conduct military action (2004, 926).  As such, Blair and his supporters 
altered the content of the traditional social democratic value of internationalism as an 
unintended consequence of the policies they enacted in response to the challenge 
posed by Kosovo.  Another key influence was complex interdependence theory, as I 
demonstrate next.        
 
According to Stephanie Lawson, ‘globalisation produces a system of complex 
interdependence where decisions “here” reverberate “there” with significant 
consequences’ (2002, 169).  The theory of complex interdependence was first 
advanced by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye in the 1970s as a response to neo-
realism, and describes a world in which levels of economic, social and environmental 
globalism are increasing and military globalism is in decline.  Under these conditions, 
Nye claims, many transnational issues, such as climate change and the arms trade, can 
only be addressed through international co-operation.  Such collective action may take 
the form of ‘transgovernmental policy co-ordination’, in which states work together, 
often through international organisations, to tackle common problems (2004, 154, 75, 
166).   
 
 14 
New Labour’s modification of the social democratic commitment to internationalism 
drew on ideas from complex interdependence theory.  This influence is clear in 
Blair’s statement that ‘it is very rare today that trouble in one part of the globe 
remains limited in its effect.  Not just in security, but in trade and finance … the 
world is interlocked’ (2002b).  Complex interdependence theory also reinforced New 
Labour’s belief that international co-operation offered the best means of addressing 
global problems.  However, New Labour’s acceptance of the reality of 
interdependence also brought the realisation that transnational threats could not be 
tackled by conventional means.  This led Blair and his supporters to modify the value 
of internationalism by advocating the use of ad hoc coalitions in situations where 
multilateralism based on formal organisations was ruled out.  Given Blair’s claim that 
this approach would uphold the authority of institutions such as the UN, we can say 
that he maintained the traditional social democratic commitment to strong 
international organisations, though he sought to realise it through very different 
means.           
 
International community 
 
The Labour Party’s approach to foreign affairs has always been guided by a belief in 
universal moral values.  For this reason, it held that its ethical principles should be 
reflected in its domestic and international policy alike.  This commitment was present 
in Wilson’s address to his 1968 party conference, which took place six months after 
Enoch Powell delivered his controversial ‘rivers of blood’ speech in Birmingham.  
Here, Wilson identified human rights as ‘the central theme of this Government’s 
actions from the day we took office’.  To support this claim, he described how he had 
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challenged the Conservatives over their racist general election campaign in 
Smethwick, and how his government had ‘issued, in the strongest terms, a warning 
against racial extremists in Rhodesia … a warning on which we had to act’.  After all, 
Wilson continued, ‘the struggle against racialism is a world-wide fight.  It is the 
dignity of man for which we are fighting.  If what we assert is true for Birmingham, it 
is true for Bulawayo’ (1968).   
 
In addition to universal values, Labour’s belief in international community often 
entailed a commitment to international co-operation.  This strategy gained momentum 
as the British Empire declined and, in 1977, James Callaghan described how his 
government had worked with the US, Europe and the international community to 
launch an initiative that would pave the way for an ‘an independent and non-racial 
Zimbabwe under majority rule in 1978’.  The Labour government thus rejected the 
‘philosophy of inferiority from the cradle to the grave’, whether in Britain or abroad 
(Callaghan 1977).  Labour’s commitment to the idea of an international community 
was subsequently reinforced by the perceived intensification of globalisation, with 
Cook arguing that, in an interdependent world, ‘foreign policy is not divorced from 
domestic policy but a central part of any political programme’ (1997).  As a result, 
Blair claimed, ‘national interest is to a significant extent governed by international 
collaboration’ (1999).   
  
As we would expect, Blair’s conception of international community was founded on a 
belief in the interdependence of states.  On this basis, he argued that ‘just as within 
domestic politics, the notion of community – the belief that partnership and co-
operation are essential to advance self-interest – is coming into its own; so it needs to 
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find its own international echo’ (1999).  This statement invoked the social democratic 
idea that the well-being of one state is inextricably bound up with that of others, and 
that the Labour Party should promote the interests of the international community as 
well as those of Britain.  Blair’s notion of international community also drew on the 
idea that there are universal moral values, which he identified as human rights, an 
open society, liberty, and the rule of law.   For Blair, it was in Britain’s national 
interest to establish these principles abroad because shared values promote 
community cohesion and reduce conflict.  In this way, he claimed, ‘values and 
interests merge’ (1999). 
 
Conor Gearty observes that, from Blair’s perspective, the September 11 attacks 
vindicated the doctrine of the international community (2003, 2).  Indeed, Blair 
subsequently argued that these events led the international community to recognise 
that the world needs order, and that progress is possible only under conditions of 
security and stability.  On Blair’s view, the prerequisites for these conditions were the 
values of democracy, justice and freedom.  ‘Where these are strong’, he argued, ‘the 
people push for moderation and order.  Where they are absent, regimes act unchecked 
by popular accountability and pose a threat; and the threat spreads’.  As a result, Blair 
concluded, ‘the promotion of these values becomes not just right in itself but part of 
our long-term security and prosperity’ (2002b).     
 
In responding to the challenges posed by the events of 9/11, Blair modified the social 
democratic idea of international community.  This response contained themes drawn 
from New Labour’s conception of domestic society, which in turn was based on the 
primary precept of Third Way politics: ‘no rights without responsibilities’ (Giddens 
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1998, 65).  For New Labour, this principle was intended to rectify the excessive 
emphasis on rights over duties that characterised post-war social democracy.  As Blair 
explained, duty ‘defines the context in which rights are given.  It is personal; but it is 
also owed to society’ (1995).  Thus, in New Labour’s thinking, rights were no longer 
seen as the automatic entitlement of all citizens as they were by earlier social 
democrats; rather, they had become conditional on the performance of specific duties 
(Bevir 2005, 68).  
 
This conditional view of rights was implicit in Blair’s conception of international 
community.  Here, each state must perform a number of duties as a member of the 
international community, among which are obligations to uphold the human rights of 
its citizens and to respect the autonomy of other states.  If a state fulfils these 
responsibilities, then it receives in return the right to self-determination, and thus is 
granted protection under the principle of non-intervention (Atkins 2011, 163-164; 
Coates and Krieger 2004, 21; McGrew 2004, 144).  However, if a state refuses to act 
responsibly, it can be compelled to do so through measures such as economic 
sanctions and military force.  As a consequence, writes Justin Rosenberg, ‘the 
absolute nature of state sovereignty is becoming … conditional upon the state 
concerned observing certain basic standards of human rights [and] democracy’ (2000, 
19).   
 
New Labour’s second modification of the social democratic concept of community 
was ‘the aspect of exclusion that follows from the new stress on the obligations of the 
recipients of the recipients of social rights’ (Bevir 2005, 68).  As we have seen, New 
Labour endorsed a contractual notion of citizenship, in which rights are conditional on 
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the performance of duties.  One implication of this approach was that if an individual 
refused to act responsibly, and so failed to keep their side of the bargain, then they 
had forfeited their rights and were therefore ‘socially excluded’.  This idea was 
evident in New Labour’s welfare-to-work programmes, where participants had a 
responsibility to accept offers of work or training – or to stop claiming benefits.  
Those who refused to participate in the schemes were no longer viewed as full 
citizens, their exclusion ‘implicit in the fact that they [were] to be denied some of the 
rights given to other citizens’ (Bevir 2005, 68). 
 
This aspect of exclusion was present in Blair’s conception of international 
community, where nations who failed to fulfil their obligations were classed as ‘rogue 
states’.  As Blair explained, such states are ‘answerable to no democratic mandate, so 
are unrestrained by the will of ordinary people.  They are extreme and inhumane.  
They detest and fear liberal, democratic and tolerant values’ (2003b).  Because ‘rogue 
states’ do not share ‘our values’ and, moreover, refuse to perform the duties ascribed 
to them, they were deemed to be excluded from the international community.  For 
Blair, the best way of dealing with these states was to instil in them ‘our values’, and 
thus bring them back into the international community.  This, he believed, would 
make the international community stronger and more cohesive, which in turn would 
increase global security and stability (2002b).    
 
The value of community was Blair’s guiding concept, and indeed was ‘presented as 
New Labour’s “Big Idea”, the idea that would renew the party’s electoral appeal’ 
(Goes 2004, 111).  To give content to this notion, New Labour turned once more to 
the social sciences, and in particular to neocommunitarianism.  Neocommunitarians 
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encourage the recognition that individuals owe certain obligations to their community, 
and that the community has a duty to ensure that both rights and responsibilities are 
upheld.  They thus define a good society as one in which individual autonomy is 
balanced with the common good, and where ‘the right to be left alone, to have one’s 
home be one’s castle, does not hold for those who violate generally held moral 
standards’.  Likewise, nations are seen as members of an international community 
who ‘share ties, moral commitments, at least a limited set of moral norms, a concern 
for the common good, and responsibility for and to the community’ (Etzioni 2006, 
78).  These responsibilities are balanced with rights, so states who fulfil their 
international obligations will receive in return the privileges of sovereignty.  
Conversely, states who fail to abide by international moral norms may be subject to 
intervention.  State sovereignty is therefore rendered conditional, with nations treated 
not as autonomous actors, but as ‘members of an international community who are 
expected to adhere to that community’s evolving norms regarding what is considered 
legitimate’ (Etzioni 2006, 72). 
 
Blair’s reworking of the concept of international community incorporated themes 
derived from neocommunitarianism.  In particular, he endorsed the notions that rights 
are accompanied by responsibilities, and that state sovereignty is conditional on the 
performance of these duties.  These ideas are evident in his belief that Iraq was acting 
irresponsibly by developing WMD and violating the human rights of its citizens, and 
that the international community therefore had a moral duty to intervene (Blair 
2002b).  On this contractual view of international citizenship, failing or authoritarian 
states are excluded from the international community, and Blair believed that Britain 
should tackle this exclusion by promoting international moral norms, or ‘our values’.  
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Such action would bring ‘rogue states’ back into the international community, and 
thus increase global order and security.  This approach was intended to advance both 
the international and the national interest, and we can therefore say that Blair upheld 
the social democratic commitment to work towards the common good of the 
international system, though he employed new means to do so.    
 
Moral leadership         
 
Over the course of the 20th century, Labour consistently emphasised the potential for 
Britain to take a leading role in international disarmament and in the tighter regulation 
of the arms trade (Vickers 2004, 197).  Its efforts to exercise moral leadership took a 
number of forms, which included the use of Britain’s influence as a member of the 
Commonwealth, the UN and NATO (Wilson 1964), its role as a ‘bridge’ between 
East and West during the Cold War, support for international negotiations on arms 
reduction (Callaghan 1980, Labour Party 1987) and, for some on the left of the party, 
unilateral nuclear disarmament.  As Foot explained, ‘I do not say [disarmament] 
would all be done by an example, but I do say that if this country insists on saying 
“we will sustain our nuclear status whatever happens,” then a lot of other countries 
are going to say exactly the same’ (1982).   
 
Alongside arms reduction, Labour’s belief in moral leadership was present in its 
desire to tackle poverty and oppression around the world.  In the immediate aftermath 
of World War II, this commitment was viewed as a means of ‘destroy[ing] the soil in 
which the seeds of war flourish’ (Attlee 1950).  However, subsequent Labour leaders 
argued that Britain had a moral responsibility to assist developing countries, and in 
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1985 Neil Kinnock told his party conference that ‘helping people to provide the 
means to grow their food, to make their clothes, to find their freedom, is our place in 
the world’.  As we will see below, these two aspects of moral leadership were present 
in New Labour thinking and, taken together, were intended to ‘restore Britain’s pride 
and influence as a leading force for good in the world’ (Labour Party 1997).           
 
New Labour’s belief in a moral leadership role for Britain reflected both the social 
democratic commitment to universal moral values and the notion that the domestic 
and international spheres are intimately connected (Vickers 2004, 197).  As Cook 
famously put it, the New Labour government  
Does not accept that political values can be left behind when we check 
in our passports to travel on diplomatic business.  Our foreign policy 
must have an ethical dimension and must support the demands of other 
peoples for the democratic rights on which we insist for ourselves 
(1997).  
This approach was motivated by the belief that it was in the national interest to 
promote Britain’s values abroad.  It also expressed a desire to win the respect of the 
international community for Britain’s contribution to peacekeeping and the promotion 
of democracy around the world, which in turn would restore its international standing 
(Cook 1997). 
 
An important component of this strategy was New Labour’s commitment to provide 
moral leadership on the issue of arms reduction.  To this end, Cook promised that his 
government would ‘give a new momentum to arms control and disarmament’.  
Indeed, he continued, New Labour had ‘already made a start with our joint statement 
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with France and Germany to work for a total ban on landmines’ (1997).  However, 
New Labour’s attempts to give moral leadership in this area soon ran into the 
perennial problem that the British arms industry was a major employer (Vickers 2004, 
202-203).  This issue came to a head over the sale of arms to Indonesia in the late 
1990s, raising the question of ‘whether Britain has sacrificed its commitment to 
human rights on the altar of trade’ (Wheeler and Dunne 1998, 861).    
 
New Labour’s attempts to provide moral leadership proved more successful in the 
area of international development.  Here, New Labour played a leading role in the 
international effort to tackle global poverty throughout its term of office, and indeed 
had achieved the majority of its goals on debt relief by 2005 (Manning 2007, 565).  
Underpinning this commitment was a belief in solidarity, which reflects the influence 
of Christian socialism on New Labour’s thinking.  As Brown explained: 
It is precisely because we believe that we have obligations beyond our 
front doors and garden gates, responsibilities beyond the city wall, duties 
beyond our national borders, that we are called on to feed the hungry, 
shelter the homeless and help the sick, whoever they are and wherever 
they are (1999).     
This conception of solidarity and global responsibility was also evident in New 
Labour’s willingness to undertake humanitarian intervention in Kosovo, which it 
reaffirmed by deploying troops to Sierra Leone in 2000.   
 
The arms control and humanitarian strands of Labour’s concept of moral leadership 
came together in Blair’s argument for intervention in Iraq.  In making this case, Blair 
emphasised the growing possibility that Saddam might diffuse his WMD technology 
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to terrorist organisations, which would lead to widespread chaos and disorder.  As 
such, action was needed to prevent the proliferation of WMD.  Blair also justified the 
invasion by reference to the suffering of the Iraqi people under Saddam’s regime, 
telling his listeners that ‘the death and torture camps, the barbaric prisons for political 
opponents, the routine beatings for anyone or their families suspected of disloyalty are 
well documented’. Such brutality should not be allowed to continue, Blair claimed, 
and the international community therefore had a duty to intervene on humanitarian 
grounds (2003a).   
    
For Blair, the solution to both of these problems was to oust Saddam and to ‘help Iraq 
move towards democracy’ (2003c).  Not only would democratisation benefit the Iraqi 
people by establishing human rights and the rule of law, Blair argued, but it would 
‘bring Iraq back into the international community where it belongs, not languishing as 
a pariah’ (2002c).  In the same vein, Straw envisaged post-Saddam Iraq as ‘a free, 
democratic and prosperous society, which can deliver for its people and take its 
rightful place in the community of nations’ (2003).  Democratisation would thus 
enable Iraq to share in the goods of community membership, while advancing the 
interests of the international community through the promotion of global security.  As 
Blair put it, ‘a stable democratic Iraq, under the sovereign rule of the Iraqi people, is a 
mortal blow to [the terrorists’] fanaticism’, and so ‘the dangers of the threat we face 
will be diminished’ (2004).   
 
Blair’s decision to democratise Iraq using military means constituted a reworking of 
the social democratic value of moral leadership.  In the past, many social democrats 
shared a ‘suspicion of the use of force as a foreign policy instrument’, which was 
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founded on a belief in anti-militarism (Vickers 2004, 201).  However, the Kosovo 
crisis led Blair to believe that ‘in protecting and advancing universal principles of 
justice the claims of national sovereignty could not automatically take precedence’ 
(McGrew 2004, 144), and that Britain could offer moral leadership by undertaking 
humanitarian intervention through ad hoc coalitions.  This interpretation proved 
controversial, given that some New Labour figures, including Brown and Short, 
believed that Britain’s leadership role lay primarily in the area of international 
development.  Others, such as Michael Meacher, held that Britain should act as a 
moral leader on environmental matters and in the fight against climate change.  So, 
although many within New Labour agreed that Britain should provide moral 
leadership to the world, they were deeply divided over how this should be achieved.   
 
Following the September 11 attacks, Blair asserted that New Labour had a unique 
opportunity to ‘re-order this world around us’ (2001).  This desire to remake the 
world in its own image reflected a longstanding tendency within the Labour party, 
which found ultimate expression in the democratisation of Iraq.  However, it also 
conflicted with Labour’s commitment to working through international organisations, 
leading Blair to argue that, in the wake of Iraq, Britain’s role was to ‘construct a 
consensus behind a broad agenda of justice and security and means of enforcing it’.  
In practical terms, he continued, this meant  
Getting the UN to understand that faced with the threats we have, we 
should do all we can to spread the values of freedom, democracy, the 
rule of law, religious tolerance and justice for the oppressed, however 
painful for some nations that may be (2004). 
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For Blair, therefore, Britain’s moral leadership role lay in persuading the UN that the 
democratisation of ‘rogue states’, through forcible means if necessary, was in the 
international interest.  He was influenced in this by democratic peace theory, which I 
discuss below.              
 
As Christopher Layne notes, democratic peace theory makes two key claims, the first 
of which is that democracies never – or at least very rarely – wage war with other 
democracies, though they are prepared to fight non-democratic states.  The second 
claim is that ‘when democracies come into conflict with one another, they only rarely 
threaten to use force, because it is “illegitimate” to do so’ (1994, 7-8).  Underpinning 
both of these statements is the idea that the (near) absence of war between 
democracies is explicable by reference to the norms and values enshrined in their 
political systems.  Although democratic peace theory has been criticised by scholars 
(e.g. Spiro 1994, Rosato 2003), it received an enthusiastic reception in the US, where 
many commentators have argued that America’s post-Cold War foreign policy should 
be based on the promotion of democracy abroad (Layne 1994, 46).              
 
We can identify themes taken from democratic peace theory in New Labour’s 
interpretation of moral leadership.  The most obvious of these is evident in Jack 
Straw’s assertion that ‘no two full democracies have ever made war on each other – 
astonishing, but true’ (2005).  Blair and his supporters also adopted the notion that the 
absence of conflict between democracies stemmed from their political values.  This 
idea is expressed in Blair’s belief that democracy promotion is in the interests of 
global peace and security.  As he told the US Congress, ‘the spread of freedom is the 
best security for the free.  It is our last line of defence and our first line of attack’ 
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(2003d).  While this belief influenced Blair’s approach to Kosovo, it acquired a new 
urgency after the events of September 11.  In consequence, Blair reframed New 
Labour’s commitment to moral leadership in terms of the need to democratise ‘rogue 
states’ such as Iraq.  The use of military force to achieve this objective was a 
departure from the anti-militarist strand of social democracy, though Labour’s 
traditional belief in the necessity of working in the international common good 
maintained a strong presence in Blair’s case for democratisation. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper has employed an interpretive approach to examine the traditions, 
rationalities and challenges that influenced the development of New Labour’s foreign 
policy.  We have seen that New Labour reworked elements of the dominant strand of 
social democracy in response to issues arising from ‘New Times’, and that it did so by 
drawing on three social scientific theories.  From complex interdependence theory, it 
took the ideas that states are becoming increasingly interconnected due to 
globalisation, and that the best means of addressing global problems is through 
international co-operation.  From neocommunitarianism, New Labour derived an 
emphasis on responsibilities and shared values as the basis for strong communities, 
and a conditional view of rights.  From democratic peace theory, it took the notion 
that democracies rarely fight each other, and that democracy promotion is therefore in 
the interests of global peace and security. 
 
These ideas, together with its reformulation of foreign policy in response to specific 
challenges, led New Labour to modify the values of internationalism, international 
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community and moral leadership.  Thus, Blair and his supporters rejected the formal 
multilateralism traditionally associated with internationalism in favour of a more ad 
hoc approach, while maintaining a commitment to strong international organisations.  
Under Blair’s leadership, New Labour also reworked its conception of international 
community, making a nation’s sovereignty conditional on its internal arrangements.  
Intervention in states who failed to fulfil their responsibilities was therefore justified 
by reference to the international common good.  Finally, Blair modified the value of 
moral leadership to allow forcible democratisation.  While this modification departed 
from the anti-militarist strand of social democracy, it was nonetheless congruent with 
Labour’s traditional enthusiasm for propagating Britain’s values around the world.  It 
was also deemed to be in the national and the international interest, on the ground that 
the democratisation of ‘rogue states’ would increase global order and stability.  
 
These modifications created a number of tensions between New Labour’s 
internationalist principles.  For instance, New Labour’s use of informal coalitions, 
together with its efforts to advance moral leadership through the transatlantic alliance, 
challenged its commitment to strong international organisations.  Further, its 
willingness to spread democratic values by force supplanted the anti-militarist strand 
within social democracy, so heralding a return to the imperialism and Atlanticism of 
the past.  It is worth drawing attention to the presence of some of these themes in 
American neo-conservatism.5  Indeed, George W. Bush and his supporters not only 
advocated ‘unilateral action and pre-emptive strikes to secure US interests’, but they 
also drew on democratic peace theory to argue that the democratisation of Iraq was 
‘vital for stabilising the Middle East and defeating global terrorism’ (Gamble and 
Wright 2004, 210-211, Ish-Shalom 2007-08, 539).  The beliefs of the British left thus 
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resonated with Bush’s interventionist liberal internationalism in a number of 
important respects (see Thorpe 2008, 271), revealing more common ground between 
the two positions than their adherents would perhaps care to admit.     
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governments remain very powerful’ (Held et al 1999, 2; see also Hirst and Thompson 1996).  In 
contrast, hyperglobalisers argue that the rise of the global economy has created a ‘borderless world’ in 
which nation states are in decline (Ohmae 1991, 1995), while transformationalists view globalisation as 
a process of economic, social and political change that is fundamentally reshaping modern societies 
and the global order alike (Giddens 1990; Scholte 1993). 
2 See, for instance, Daddow and Broad 2010 and Hughes and Smith 1998 on Britain’s relations with 
Europe; Manning 2007 and Porteous 2005 on international development; Daddow 2009 and Vickers 
2000 on the Kosovo war; and Bellamy 2004 and Atkins 2011, Ch. 9 on the invasion of Iraq. 
3 For a discussion of New Labour’s use of ‘rationalities’ in a domestic context, see inter alia Bevir 
2003, 2005; Bevir and O’Brien 2001; Bevir and Rhodes 2003; and the forthcoming  special issue of 
Policy & Politics, edited by Bevir and Gains.  This themed edition explores ‘both the processes 
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‘institutionalism, communitarianism, network theory and neo-Keynesianism’ (Bevir and Gains 2011, 
forthcoming).    
4 The converse also applied, and Harold Wilson justified his government’s anti-racism legislation by 
arguing that ‘it would be hypocrisy to condemn racialism and colour prejudice and apartheid abroad if 
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5 I thank Reviewer 1 for making this point. 
